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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC 
TRUST DOCTRINE: USING AN 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE TO ADAPT TO 










A little-known artifact of the California Gold Rush was the filling of 
San Francisco Bay. Thousands of forty-niners steamed around Cape 
Horn and swarmed ashore in Yerba Buena Cove, abandoning their 
vessels in San Francisco‘s idyllic harbor to seek gold in the Sierra 
foothills. 
Yerba Buena Cove became a forest of masts.  Hundreds of hulks lay 
abandoned.  Some of them were used as warehouses, offices, or public 
buildings. One became the city jail. Around others the land was filled 
 
 This article is based on a memorandum prepared for the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission in 2008. However, the views and opinions described herein are entirely 
those of the authors and not of the Commission or the State of California. 
 Chief Counsel, San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. 
**Anticipated J.D., Vermont Law School (2010). Mr. Bothwell served as a legal intern at the San 
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission and the Center for Ocean Solutions. 
***J.D., University of California Hastings College of the Law (2009). Ms. Vaughn served as a legal 
intern at the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, the Law Offices of 
Stephan C. Volker, and the U.S. Department of Justice--Environment and Natural Resources 
Division. 
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in, and they became a permanent part of the city. . . . Eventually the 
cove was completely filled in.
1
 
Soon, the flood of fortune-seekers spread across San Francisco Bay.  
Towns like Oakland and Sausalito sprang up overnight, and the filling of 
San Francisco Bay began in earnest. By 1960, one- third of the Bay had 
been filled, and a plan was devised to reduce the Bay to a mere river.
2
 To 
three dynamic women from Berkeley this was the final straw.
3
  They 
created a new organization called ―Save the Bay‖ and in 1965 
successfully lobbied for legislation that created the nation‘s first coastal 
management agency – the San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission (BCDC) – with its chief mission to prohibit 
Bay fill and provide for public access. 
By all accounts, BCDC and its local, state and federal partners have 
been remarkably successful at reducing Bay fill and restoring Bay 
habitat. Prior to 1965, about 2,300 acres of San Francisco Bay were filled 
each year.
4
 Today, just a few acres are filled annually, and only for 
water-oriented uses, so that the Bay is more than 15,000 acres larger 
today than it was when BCDC was established.
5
 
But the Bay is currently confronted with another, even more 
daunting problem: global climate change and sea level rise. A projected 
sixteen- to fifty-five-inch rise in sea level during the next century 
threatens 270,000 Bay Area residents and $62 billion worth of shoreline 
development, including both international airports, Silicon Valley, much 
of the freeway system, and the Bay‘s entire estuarine ecosystem.
6
 




 HAROLD GILLIAM, SAN FRANCISCO BAY 62 (1957). 
 
2
 Between 1850 and 1960 an average of four square miles of the Bay were filled each year, 
reducing the open Bay from 787 square miles from the days of the Gold Rush to 430 square miles a 
century later. RICE ODELL, THE SAVING OF SAN FRANCISCO BAY: A REPORT ON CITIZEN ACTION 
AND REGIONAL PLANNING, THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION 8 (1972). Plans were proposed to fill 
another 325 square miles, which would have reduced the Bay to little more than a broad river. SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, HISTORY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/history.shtml. 
 
3
 The three women were Mrs. Catherine Kerr, Mrs. Sylvia McLaughlin, and Mrs. Esther 
Gullick. Mrs. Kerr‘s husband, Clark Kerr, was the president of the University of California. ODELL, 
supra note 2, at 10-11. 
 
4
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, BCDC‘S MISSION, 
www.bcdc.ca.gov/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
 
5
 Id.; see also SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, 2009 ANNUAL 
STATISTICS (2009) (on file with authors). 
 
6
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, LIVING WITH A RISING BAY: 
VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY AND ON THE SHORELINE, DRAFT STAFF 
REPORT 59 (2009), available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/proposed_bay_plan/bp_1-08_cc_draft.pdf. 
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equipped to address the modern challenges presented by a bay expanding 
from rising sea levels and climate change. Moreover, recent judicial 
interpretations extending the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution – the so-called ―Takings Clause‖ – to environmental and 
land-use regulations further restricts the ability of BCDC and other 




However, BCDC and other state coastal management agencies have 
at their disposal an ancient tool: the ―public trust doctrine.‖ Dating back 
to Roman times, the public trust doctrine establishes a ―public easement‖ 
over navigable waters and tidelands that can be used to help address 
modern challenges presented by rising sea levels caused by a warming 
climate. 
The predicament faced in San Francisco Bay is confronted in bays 
and estuaries throughout the nation. Using BCDC as a case study, this 
Article examines the threats posed by climate change to San Francisco 
Bay, the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the Takings 
Clause, and how the public trust doctrine can help public agencies 
address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise by: 
  Enhancing limited permit authority; 
  Requiring fees to mitigate the impacts of climate change; 
  Addressing the impacts of shoreline armoring; 
  Utilizing rolling easements and other legal mechanisms; 
  Protecting wetlands, marshes, and salt ponds; 
  Implementing the California Environmental Quality Act and 
Coastal Zone Management Act; and 
  Pursuing common law remedies to preserve open space and 
public access. 
II. THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON COASTAL COMMUNITIES 
AND SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
The impacts of climate change on San Francisco Bay during the 
next 100 years will dramatically change the Bay‘s uses, boundaries, 
ecosystem, and infrastructure. The California Climate Change Center 
projects that by 2100, average temperatures in California could rise 
between three and 10.5 degrees Fahrenheit,
8




 ―Takings‖ jurisprudence will be discussed at length throughout this Article. 
 
8
 CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT BIENNIAL REPORT 1.5 
(2009), available at www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CAT-1000-2009-003/CAT-1000-2009-
003-D.PDF. 
3
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Bay as much as fifty-five inches, and drastically changing the Bay‘s 
shoreline.
9
 BCDC has shown how a one-meter rise in the level of the Bay 
will inundate 200 square miles of low-lying shoreline areas, including 
some of the region‘s most valuable infrastructure and economic centers 
such as San Francisco and Oakland International Airports, portions of 
Silicon Valley, and much of the area between Richmond and San 
Pablo.
10
 The far north and south ends of the Bay, the South Bay, San 
Pablo Bay, and the area surrounding the mouth of the Petaluma River are 
particularly vulnerable to flooding.
11
 
The combination of higher baseline mean sea level, changes in river 
flows, and weather effects may increase the frequency and duration of 
high sea level extremes. Extreme sea levels and storm surge will threaten 
existing flood-control structures and prompt some property owners to 
construct larger and more structurally sound levees and sea walls. In the 
past, maintaining and expanding the existing system of flood-control 
structures has come at the expense of the Bay‘s shoreline ecosystems. 
BCDC analysis shows that much existing public access to and along the 
shoreline is likely to flood by the year 2050.
12
 The construction of 
seawalls and other erosion-control devices to protect existing 
development and low-lying areas may further exacerbate impacts on 
public access and unprotected areas of the Bay.
13
 
This is not just a problem for the Bay Area. Many coastal 
communities will be faced with utilizing expensive and potentially 
damaging erosion and flood-control methods to combat sea level rise. 
Studies have shown that such methods may actually increase risks of 
erosion and dynamic coastal process, and also may generate a false sense 
of security that fosters development in flood-prone areas.
14
 In California 
alone, the cost of building static structures to protect against a fifty-five-
inch rise in sea level would be $14 billion.
15
 A sea level rise of fifty-five 
inches will inundate more than 25% of California‘s remaining 550 square 
miles of valuable wetlands.
16




 Id. at 1.10. 
 
10
 See SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 6, at 59. 
 
11
 See id. at 60, 82. 
 
12
 Id. at 18. 
 
13
 See Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem 
Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 533, 539-42 (2007). 
 
14
 Adam Parris & Leslie Lacko, Climate Change Adaptation in the San Francisco Bay: A 






 Brief for Coastal States Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., No 08-1151 (Oct. 5, 2009)  2009 
WL 6046172, available at www.coastalstates.org/uploads/CSO%20Amicus%20Brief_STBR_08-
4
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threaten nearly 87,000 homes and other buildings.
17
 Even a twenty-inch 
rise in sea levels may cause an estimated $23-170 billion in damage 
nationally by 2100 from increased storm intensity and frequency.
18
 Rapid 
erosion and increased coastal and inland flooding will have disastrous 
effects on beach habitats, wetlands, and coastal forests.
19
 
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine dates back to Roman times and the Code 
of Justinian, which proclaimed that ―the shores are not understood to be 
property of any man.‖
20
 The doctrine was imported to the American 
colonies from England, where navigable waters and underlying tidelands 
and submerged lands were owned by the Crown but remained subject to 




The doctrine remained imbedded in American common law when 
the colonies declared their independence. Each state acquired ownership 
of the navigable waters, including the tidelands and submerged lands 
within its jurisdiction, when it joined the Union,
22
 and developed its own 
public trust doctrine and public trust uses.
23
 Today the doctrine creates a 
duty for states to protect the common heritage of their coastal lands and 
waters for preservation and public use.
24
 In effect, it establishes a ―public 
 
115.pdf (―In California . . . [a]n estimated 550 square miles, or 350,000 acres, of wetlands exist 
along the California coast, valued at approximately $5,000-$200,000 per acre. A sea level rise of 1.4 
meters (55 inches), will flood approximately 150 square miles of land immediately adjacent to 
current wetlands.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 
17
 Id. at 20. 
 
18
 Id. at 24. 
 
19
 Id. at 24-25. 
 
20
 J. INST. 2.1.5 (THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Thomas Collett Sanders trans.  158 (1876), 
citing Institutes of Justinian 2.1.5 (AD 533). Section 2.1.1 of the code also states that, ―[b]y the law 
of nature these things are common to all mankind – the air, running water, the sea and consequently 
the shores of the sea.  No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided that he 
respects habitations, monuments and the buildings, which are not, like the sea, subject only to the 
law of nations.‖ Id. 2.1.1. 
 
21
 Jack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the 
“Takings” Doctrines:  Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal Areas, 20 VT. L. REV. 81, 83-84 




 Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935). 
 
23
 STEPHEN E. ROADY, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 39, 41 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds. 2008). 
 
24
 Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1983); 
see also State v. Superior Ct. (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 231 (Cal. 1981); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 
374, 381 (Cal. 1971).  Persuasive arguments also have been made that a federal public trust doctrine 
5
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easement‖ held by the state over tidelands and submerged lands, 
including those lands transferred to private ownership (unless the trust 
has been specifically terminated by legislation). Accordingly, even where 




A. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE 
The geographic scope of the public trust doctrine traditionally 
extends to lands under ―navigable waters,‖ including rivers, streams, and 
lakes, as well as submerged lands and tidelands.
26
 Submerged lands 
include all navigable riverbeds and lakebeds up to the ordinary low water 
mark, and lands underlying state ocean and estuarine waters. Tidelands 
include all areas subject to tidal influence up to the ordinary high water 
mark, as measured by the mean high tide line. The mean high tide line is 
determined by averaging the height of the all tides over an 18.6-year 
period reflecting the time it takes for the moon to complete a cycle 
during which its distance from the earth and sun varies.
27
 In California, 
the public trust doctrine applies up to the mean high tide line. This stands 
in stark contrast to so-called ―low tide‖ states where the sea boundary of 
privately owned oceanfront property is the mean low tide line, and public 




should exercise the same fiduciary responsibilities beyond state waters in the United States 
Exclusive Economic Zone.  See Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E. Roady, Raphael Sagarin &, Larry B. 
Crowder, The Silver Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years 
of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L. 
Q. 1, 40-50 (2009); ROADY, supra note 23, at 41. 
 
25
 See SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN 
79 (2008), available at www.bcdc.ca.gov/pdf/planning/plans/bayplan/bayplan.pdf. 
 
26
 All tidelands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide are subject to the public trust doctrine 
regardless of whether the waters are navigable-in-fact. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 
U.S. 469, 481 (1988). 
 
27
 Borax Consol., 296 U.S. at 23-24; People v. William Kent Estate Co., 51 Cal. Rptr. 215, 
218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (―The ‗high water mark‘ is not ‗a physical mark made upon the ground by 
the waters; it means the line of high water as determined by the course of the tides‘. . . . The ebb and 
flow of the tide, and the varying heights of the several tides, are largely caused by the gravity forces 
of moon and sun, the former exercising about double the effect of the latter. The varying positions of 
these two bodies, in relation to each other and to the particular point of the earth‘s surface being 
considered, effect substantial differences in the height of the several high tides. The most commonly 
recognized variations follow the phases of the moon. But the lunar month is not a sufficient period to 
determine an average of high tides. Rather, the full range of astronomical variants affecting the 
height of tides is deemed covered only in 18.6 years.‖). 
 
28
 Five states allow private ownership to the mean low water mark: Maine, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia. In these states the trust applies below the mean low water 
line. Barbara A. Vestal, Dueling with Boat Oars, Dragging Through Mooring Lines: Time for More 
Formal Resolution of Use Conflicts in States’ Coastal Waters?, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 26 n.87 
6
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the other hand, Texas asserts public trust rights beyond the mean high 
tide line to the first line of natural vegetation.
29
 Areas landward of mean 
high tide are generally excluded from the public trust unless necessary to 
protect trust uses and resources.
30
 
In California, the geographic scope of the public trust doctrine 
extends to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waterways
31
 to debris 
fills impairing navigation and other uses of navigable waters,
32
 and to 
substantial diversions of non-navigable waters that feed navigable 
streams.
33
 However, the public trust does not apply to tidelands perfected 
by federal patents pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which 
formally ended the Mexican-American war in 1848, because California 
failed to assert its public easement during the patent confirmation 
proceedings.
34
 Though no case law speaks to patented inland parcels, 
California may also be precluded from asserting the public trust over 
nine million acres of patented lands.
35
 
B. PUBLIC TRUST USES 
The public trust doctrine generally guarantees public rights to 
navigable waters, tidelands, and submerged lands for traditional uses of 
fishing, navigation, and commerce.
36
 The California Constitution also 
 
(1999); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-77 (Me. 1989); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569-70 (Mass. 1974). 
 
29
 TEX. NAT. RES. § 61.018 (a-1)(2),(3) (Westlaw 2010).  See infra notes 195-204 and 
accompanying text for discussion of rolling easements. 
 
30




 Id. at 721. 
 
32
 See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 147 (Cal. 1884).  The fills at 
issue in that case were waste products from the use of water cannons to wash gold ore from hillsides, 
which dumped 600,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel annually into the north fork of the American 
River. Id. at 144. 
 
33
 See People ex rel. Roberts v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 106 (Cal. 1901). 
 
34
 See Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 202, 209 (1984).  Though a federal patent 
could not dispense with a state‘s sovereign rights, the deeds of Spanish and Mexican grantees were 
patented ―pursuant to the authority reserved to the United States to enable it to discharge its 
international duty with respect to land which, although tideland, had not passed to the State.‖ Id. at 
205.  Patent proceedings focusing on Spanish and Mexican law and custom might arguably attach a 
public trust easement to title, as public trust rights under Spanish and subsequently Mexican law, 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, serve as an independent basis for the public trust 
doctrine in California.  Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 719 
n.15 (Cal. 1983). 
 
35
 Summa Corp., 466 U.S. at 209; see also Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: 




 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988). 
7
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guarantees basic trust rights of public access to navigable waters
37
 and 
the right to fish on and from public lands and waters.
38
 In addition, 
California courts have long recognized that trust uses on tidelands are 
sufficiently flexible to evolve over time based upon ―changing public 
needs,‖ and that ―in administering the trust the state is not burdened with 




Consequently, the trust in California extends to recreational uses 
such as the right to use navigable waters ―to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to 
use for boating and general recreation purposes . . . and to use the bottom 
of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.‖
40
 
More significantly, the courts have defined the public trust doctrine to 
include ―the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that 
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and 
as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.‖
41
 A 
recent California ruling also found that the public could enforce the trust 
to protect birds and wildlife threatened by wind turbines at Altamont 
Pass, even though they were not located on tidelands or submerged 
lands.
42




 CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4 (―No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or 
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this 
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any 
public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall 
enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the 
navigable waters of this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.‖) Based upon this 
provision, a county ordinance was invalidated that prohibited rafting on the South Fork of the 
American River ―because it denies the constitutional right of the public use and access to a navigable 
stream.‖ People v. El Dorado County, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). The California 
Legislature has also enacted numerous statutes to provide such access (E.g., CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 
66602, 66632.4 (Westlaw 2010) (McAteer-Petris Act); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30210-30212 
(Westlaw 2010) (California Coastal Act); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 31400-31405 (Westlaw 2010) 
(authorizing California Coastal Conservancy to acquire, develop and operate coastal access-ways). 
 
38
 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25  (―The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the public 
lands of the State and in the waters thereof, . . . and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or 
transferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to fish thereupon . . . ‖). 
 
39
 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
 
40
 Id. at 380; see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1045 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1971) (―With our ever- increasing population, its ever-increasing leisure time . . . …and the 
ever- increasing need for recreational areas (witness the hundreds of camper vehicles carrying 
people to areas where boating, fishing, swimming and other water sports are available), it is 
extremely important that the public need not be denied use of recreational water . . . . [t]he rule is 




 Whitney, 491 P.2d at 380 (emphasis added). 
 
42
 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595-96 (Cal. 
8
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navigable waters that harm navigable waters (e.g., diverting non-
navigable waters that harm Mono Lake).
43
 
Thus, the public trust doctrine has evolved from permitting certain 
uses to protecting trust values
44
 and therefore may support affirmative 
action to prevent harm to public trust lands and waters in a manner 
similar to abating a public nuisance.
45
 
C. CONVEYING PUBLIC TRUST LANDS   
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that states have the 
exclusive right to hold tidelands and submerged lands in trust for public 
benefit.
46
 Although states may convey portions of such lands to public or 
private entities for trust purposes such as improving waterways by 
constructing ports, docks and wharves, the conveyance may not 
substantially impair public trust rights, and the lands conveyed generally 
remain subject to a public trust easement.
47
 
Conveyances that pass title to trust property do not extinguish trust 
rights or the public easement unless the trustee determines that the lands 
are no longer suitable for trust purposes.
48
 When private owners receive 
title to trust lands, they do so subject to the paramount power of the state 
to exercise the public trust.
49
 Therefore, public trust rights generally 
persist on privately owned trust lands and may be asserted by the state or 
 
Ct. App. 2008). However, the court held that members of the public could enforce the trust against 
the government, not the private companies operating the windmills. Id. at 607.  Only the government 
as trustee could enforce the trust against private parties. Id. 
 
43




 Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 91. Thus, the state as administrator and controller of the 
public trust has the right ―to enter upon and possess the same for the preservation and advancement 
of the public uses and to make such changes and improvements as may be deemed advisable for 
those purposes.‖  People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 599 (Cal. 1913). 
 
45
 Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 93.    
 
46
 Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (―[T]he state holds title to soils under 
tide water, by the common law . . . and that title necessarily carries with it control over the waters 
above them, whenever the lands are subjected to use . . .‖). 
 
47
 Id. at 453-54.  (―The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers.‖). The waters of the state are also a public trust resource that is held separately in trust by 
the state for the benefit of the people. Id. at 456. The waters of the state are owned and controlled by 
the state and cannot be privately owned, although a private individual may acquire a limited right to 
the use of such waters only. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1001 (Westlaw 2010); Kidd v. 




 See Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. at 597. 
 
49
 Id. at 596. (the grantee of trust lands does not obtain absolute ownership but takes ―title to 
the soil . . . subject to the public right of navigation.‖). 
9
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When California became a state in 1850, it assumed responsibility 
over nearly four million acres of public trust lands and waters, including 
San Francisco Bay.
51
 Shortly thereafter, the California Legislature 
conveyed nearly half of the Bay and San Francisco waterfront to local 
governments and private parties.
52
 Before this practice was curtailed, 
some submerged lands were filled and improved, including the Financial 
District of San Francisco, and were declared free of the public trust.
53
 
But virtually all unfilled tidelands and submerged lands, and even some 






 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (Cal. 1980). 
 
51
 Pollard‘s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845) (California assumed ownership of its 
tidelands and submerged lands on equal footing with other states.  The Equal Footing Doctrine 
provides that that whenever a state enters the Union, ―such state shall be admitted . . . on an equal 
footing with the original states in all respects whatever.‖). 
 
52
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT COMM., SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN SUPPLEMENT 413-414 
(January 1969) (―Not only has much of the Bay – perhaps as much as 22% -- been sold to private 
buyers, but the remainder of the Bay is also divided in ownership.  The State in the past has granted 
about 23 % of the Bay to cities and counties, and now owns outright only about 50%.  The 
remaining 5% is owned by the federal government.‖). The McAteer-Petris Act amended the terms of 
all existing legislative trust grants that conveyed tidelands and submerged lands to the following 
local governments: Alameda, Albany, City and County of San Francisco, Benicia, Oakland, City of 
San Mateo, County of San Mateo, Vallejo, Richmond, South San Francisco, Berkeley, Burlingame, 
Emeryville, Pittsburg, Redwood City, Sausalito, Antioch, Mill Valley, County of Marin, County of 
Sonoma, San Leandro, Peralta Junior College District, San Rafael, San Francisco Port District and 
East Bay Regional Park District. See generally, CAL. GOV‘T. CODE § 66600, et. seq. (Westlaw 
2010); see also People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Comm‘n v. Town of 
Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 543 (Cal. 1968) (many of these grants specifically enumerate the types 
of uses that may be made of the granted lands by the grantees, but all are also subject to BCDC 
jurisdiction under the McAteer-Petris Act). 
 
53
 City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 479 (Cal. 1970); see also Marks v. 
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971). These areas are generally filled former tidelands that no longer 
provide benefits to the public.  However, the filling of trust lands in and of itself does not terminate 
the public trust.  The Legislature must specifically terminate the trust. To prevent abuses from the 
indiscriminate conveyance of tidelands shortly after statehood, article X, section 3, of the California 
Constitution prohibited the sale of all tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city or city and 
county. In 1909, the Legislature prohibited all tideland sales to private parities. CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE § 7991 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
54
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 79. The 
McAteer-Petris Act makes legislatively granted tidelands in the Bay subject to BCDC jurisdiction.  
Town of Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d at 549. Courts have held that legislatively granted tidelands must be 
used for statewide public purposes.  See Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 44 Cal. 2d 199, 211 (Cal. 
1955); Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).  This would 
support Commission efforts to address impacts from climate change and sea level rise. 
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D. STEWARDSHIP OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY 
States generally delegate the management of trust lands and waters 
to a specific agency. In California, the Legislature has granted 
stewardship of its public trust lands to the State Lands Commission, 
which can lease and convey trust lands, but only for trust purposes.
55
 
Uses inconsistent with the public trust (i.e., non-trust-related uses) are 
generally those that do not require waterfront locations, like residential 
and non-water-related commercial office uses.
56
 
The management of trust lands and waters generally involves 
monitoring the activities of grantees to ensure compliance with the terms 
of the statutory grants under the public trust doctrine,
57
 acquiring and 
condemning lands needed for access to navigable waters,
58
 exchanging 
trust lands no longer useful for trust purposes,
59
 and purchasing lands 
usable for trust purposes.
60
 Agencies like the California State Lands 
Commission also can prevent activities on trust lands inconsistent with 
trust needs, sue for ejectment, trespass, and damages,
61
 and allow trust 






 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6216, 6301 (Westlaw 2010). The State Lands Commission is not 
the only state-designated trustee agency. The State Water Board has trustee authority over the state‘s 
fresh water resources under CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 et seq. (Westlaw 2010), and the Department 
of Fish and Game has trustee authority over the state‘s fish and wildlife resources under CAL. FISH & 
G. CODE § 700 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). Other state agencies, such as the California Coastal 
Commission, Department of Forestry and Regional Water Quality Control Boards, while not 
designated state trustee agencies, exercise legislative common law trust powers. Moreover, every 
other state agency has the duty to consider and protect public trust resources in the administration of 
its statutory mandate. Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Extending Public Trust Duties to Vermont’s 
Agencies: A Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L. REV. 509, 
530 (1995) (―[A]gencies have common law public trust duties despite the absence of an express 
legislative delegation of such duties.‖). 
 
56
 State Lands Commission policy provides that ―[u]ses that are generally not permitted on 
public trust lands are those that are not trust use related, do not serve a public purpose, and can be 
located on non-waterfront property, such as residential and non-maritime related commercial and 
office uses. While trust lands cannot generally be alienated from public ownership, uses of trust 
lands can be carried out by public or private entities by lease from this Commission or a local agency 
grantee. In some cases, such as some industrial leases, the public may be excluded from public trust 
lands in order to accomplish a proper trust use.‖ California State Lands Commission, Public Trust 




 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6306 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
58
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6210.9. 
 
59
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6307(a)(5). 
 
60
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 8610-8633. 
 
61
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6216.1, 6224.1, 6302. 
 
62
 See Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 400-02 (Cal. 1936); Oakland v. 
Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 163 (Cal. 1897) (state must pay for the use or removal of 
11
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Agencies that manage state trust lands may share their public trust 
responsibilities with other state agencies.  In California, BCDC is 
authorized to coordinate and implement trust uses in the Bay ―in the 
state‘s capacity as trustee of the tidelands.‖
63
 BCDC does not have the 
right to convey or lease trust lands; that authority remains with the 
California State Lands Commission.
64
 But both BCDC and the State 
Lands Commission share authority to limit public and private uses of 
trust lands in San Francisco Bay.
65
 
BCDC exercises its public trust responsibilities through its statutory 
authority under the McAteer-Petris Act ―to issue or deny permits for any 
proposed project that involves placing fill, extracting materials or making 
any substantial change in use of water, land or structure within the area 
of the commission‘s jurisdiction.‖
66
 The California State Lands 
Commission is guided by BCDC‘s enabling laws, which require 
―maximum feasible public access,‖
67
 ensure that the public benefits of 
fill in the Bay clearly exceed public detriments,
68
 and preserve water-
oriented uses.
69




BCDC has been charged with developing policies under the San 
Francisco Bay Plan to implement its statutory authority under the 
McAteer-Petris Act, and it may amend portions of the Bay Plan as 
conditions warrant, so long as the changes are consistent with the Act.
71
 
In exercising its authority under the Act and the Bay Plan, courts have 




The Bay Plan calls upon the Commission to ensure that Bay fill is 
 




 City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 531-32 (Cal. 1980). 
 
64
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6301. 
 
65
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6302. 
 
66
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66604 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
67
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66602, 66632.4. 
 
68
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a). 
 
69
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66602, 66605, 66611. 
 
70
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 29002 (Westlaw 2010) (Marsh preservation); § 29009 (public 




 CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 66651, 66652 (Westlaw 2010). BCDC also has developed policies 
in the Suisun Marsh Protection Plan to implement the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act.  See CAL. 
PUB. RES. CODE § 29008 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
72
 See People ex. rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n v. Town of 
Emeryville, 69 Cal. 2d 533, 545-47 (Cal. 1968); see also Candlestick Properties., Inc. v. San 
Francisco Bay Conservation & Development Comm‘n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
12
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consistent with public trust uses
73
 and that its actions are ―consistent with 
the public trust needs for the area.‖
74
 The Bay Plan describes trust uses 
―such as commerce, navigation, fisheries, wildlife habitat, recreation and 
open space.‖
75
 However, as noted above, California courts have 
recognized that trust uses also include ―the preservation of those lands in 
their natural state . . . as open space, and as environments which provide 
food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the 
scenery and climate of the area.‖
76
 While these trust uses do not provide 
any additional legal authority, they may be used in support of BCDC‘s 
existing authority under the McAteer–Petris Act, the Bay Plan, and its 
other laws and policies to protect public trust uses.
77
 These laws are 
direct legislative expressions of the common law public trust doctrine,
78
 
and BCDC exercises its trust responsibilities whenever it acts on a 
permit, adopts a Bay Plan or Marsh Plan amendment, adopts a Special 
Area Plan, or changes a regulation. 
IV. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Government agencies may confront constitutional limitations on the 
―taking‖ of private property when they seek to address the impacts of 
climate change and rising sea levels by preserving vulnerable tidelands 
or wetlands, restricting development in hazardous areas, or limiting 
certain uses in and along water bodies like San Francisco Bay. However, 
government actions asserting a public trust easement on trust lands 
generally do not constitute a taking. 
The Fifth Amendment‘s ―Takings Clause‖ provides that private 
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation.
79
 
The Takings Clause does not prohibit government from taking private 
property; it requires that property owners be compensated for the value 
of the property taken. According to the U. S. Supreme Court, the Takings 




 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 75. 
 
74






 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). 
 
77
 Informal Advice from California Department of Justice to Michael Wilmar, Executive 
Director of San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission, Apr. 28, 1982 at 26, 38. 
 
78
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 79. 
 
79
 U.S. CONST. amend. V (―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.‖ 
(emphasis added). This provision is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. California has a similar provision in its state constitution, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
13
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alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.‖
80
 Much has been written about the 
Takings Clause, and a comprehensive review is not intended here except 
as it relates to the public trust doctrine. 
Government can take private property in a number of ways: by 
direct appropriation, by physical occupation or invasion, or by 
regulation.
81
 A taking by direct appropriation occurs when government 
condemns property by eminent domain for a highway, public works 
project, or other public purpose.
82
 In such cases the property owner must 
be compensated.
83
 Government may also require or authorize property to 
be physically occupied or invaded for a public purpose, such as causing 
property to be flooded or allowing the installation of cable TV 
equipment.
84
 Taking property by permanent physical occupation or 
invasion is considered a ―per se‖ or categorical taking,
85
 and 
compensation must be provided regardless of the economic impact or the 
amount of property taken.
86
 
A. TOTAL TAKING 
The Supreme Court has established a per se or categorical taking 
rule when government regulation renders property essentially valueless. 
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
87
 South Carolina denied a 
permit to build a residence seaward of a setback line on an eroding 
beach. Since no alternative beneficial uses were viable on the property 




 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 
81
 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 10 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
82
 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the Supreme Court upheld 
the use of eminent domain to take private property for economic redevelopment. Id. at 489. The 
Court held that ―without exception, our cases have defined [public use] broadly, reflecting our 
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.‖ Id. at 480. 
 
83
 BCDC does not have condemnation authority and therefore cannot directly appropriate 
private property.  See Jonathan Smith & Alan Pendleton, San Francisco Bay Conservation and 
Development Commission: Challenge and Response After 30 Years, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 
269, 274-280 (1998) (discussing BCDC‘s jurisdiction and authority). 
 
84
 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 426-27 (1982). 
 
85
 A physical occupation is ―a permanent and exclusive occupation by the government that 
destroys the owner‘s right to possession, use and disposal of . . . property.‖  Boise Cascade Corp. v. 
United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 
86
 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg‘l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 
(2002) (A permanent physical occupation occurs ―when the government appropriates part of a 
rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants [and] it is required to pay for that 
share no matter how small.‖). 
 
87
 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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determined that government action denied ―all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land.‖
88
 This kind of total taking generally requires 
compensation to the landowner unless the restrictions ―inhere in the title 
itself‖ and in background principles of property law and nuisance (this 
important exception is discussed further below).
89
 Subsequent Court 
decisions have clarified that the availability of other beneficial uses on 
the property, such as development on an upland portion of coastal 
wetlands, would preclude a finding that there is a total taking.
90
 
B. REGULATORY TAKING 
A taking is less clear however, when a permit or regulation reduces 
allowable uses, diminishes private property values, or requires the owner 
to provide a public benefit such as public access. State law sometimes 
specifically prohibits an agency from issuing or denying a permit in a 
manner that takes private property without just compensation.
91
 
Nevertheless, takings issues may arise whenever an agency denies a 
permit, imposes a permit condition, or otherwise restricts the use of 
private property that would impede efforts to address the impacts of 
climate change and sea level rise. 
Not every permit or regulation that diminishes property values is a 
regulatory taking. Indeed, the U. S. Supreme Court recognized that 
―government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law.‖
92
 Even government regulations that require the 




 Id. at 1015. The ruling is narrow and applies only ―in the extraordinary circumstance when 
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted‖ or the property is rendered 
―valueless.‖ Id. at 1017, 1020. 
 
89
 Id. at 1029. 
 
90
 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-01 (2001). 
 
91
 The McAteer-Petris Act states that ―[t]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that this 
title is not intended, and shall not be construed, as authorizing the commission to exercise its power 
to grant or deny a permit in a manner which will take or damage private property for public use, 
without the payment of just compensation therefor.‖ CAL. GOV CODE § 66606 (Westlaw 2010). A 
similar provision is contained in the Suisun Marsh Preservation Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 29013 
(Westlaw 2010). However, no BCDC decision has ever been held to constitute a taking. See, e.g., 
Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation Comm‘n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1975) (holding that the adoption of a BCDC resolution ―fixing and establishing within the 
shoreline band the boundaries of the water-oriented priority land uses‖ did not constitute a taking); 
Candlestick Props., Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557 




 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
15
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necessary to abate a threat to public health and safety, because no one 
―has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise 
harm others.‖
93
 However, the Court noted long ago: that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, ―if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.‖
94
 It then spent the next eighty years trying to 
articulate a clear test to determine when a particular regulation goes ―too 
far.‖ 
Until recently, the Court relied on ad hoc (some say confusing) 
factual inquiries.
 95
 Much has been written on the efficacy of these tests, 
but for this analysis we examine four tests: the ―total loss of all beneficial 
use‖ test used in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the three-
factor test used in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 
the ―essential nexus‖ test used in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission, and the ―rough proportionality‖ test used in Dolan v. City 
of Tigard. 
C. PENN CENTRAL FACTORS 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
96
 the 
Supreme Court established the principal guidance for ―resolving 
regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or 
Lucas [total taking] rules.‖
97
 Although unable to fashion a ―set formula‖ 
for evaluating takings claims,
98
 the Court set forth three factors to 
determine whether a taking occurs: the economic impact of the 
regulation, the character of the government action, and the degree of 




 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass‘n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987). 
 
94
 Id. at 508 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)) (emphasis added). 
 
95
 The Court‘s recent ruling in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), finding 
that a Hawaii statute that limited the rent that oil companies charge dealers that lease company-
owned service stations was not a taking, provides some much-needed clarity to takings 
jurisprudence. The Court noted that regulatory takings exist when government requires an owner to 
suffer a permanent physical invasion of property – however minor – or where regulations completely 
deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use. Id. at 538. It then stated that, ―[o]utside these 
two relatively narrow categories (and the special context of land-use exactions discussed below [e.g., 
in Nollan and Dolan]), regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn 
Central. . . . Primary among those factors are ‗[t]he economic impact of the regulation . . . on the 
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the government has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed . . . expectations‘ . . . [and] . . . the ‗character of the governmental action . . . .‖  
Id. at 538-39 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 
96
 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104 (1978). 
 
97
 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
 
98
 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U. S. at 124. 
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expectations.‖
99
 The economic impact of the regulation factor refers to 
the Lucas ruling under which the elimination of all value of the property 
will generally result in a taking.
100
 The character of the government 
regulation factor examines whether the regulation is for a public 
purpose.
101
 The reasonable investment-backed expectation factor 
examines whether a buyer knows that that an existing law or regulation 
prohibits or restricts development on the property when the land is 
purchased.
102
 Thus, for example, an owner would normally not have 
reasonable investment-backed expectations for filling tidelands for non-
trust private residential or agricultural uses under the public trust 
doctrine,
103




The Court also fashioned two additional takings tests to be used 
when development exactions or conditions require the dedication of land 
for public uses: the ―essential nexus‖ test, and the ―rough 
proportionality‖ test. 
D. ESSENTIAL NEXUS 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
105
 the Court ruled that 
a taking occurred when the Coastal Commission required a property 







 The mere diminution in the value of property alone, or the denial of the highest and best 
use or most profitable use of property, does not constitute a taking.  See Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. 
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 
405 (1915) (reduction in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was held not a taking); Florida Rock 
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 
101
 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. In Lingle, the Court concluded that the ―character of the 
government action‖ factor in Penn Central examines whether a regulation ―amounts to a physical 
invasion or instead merely affects property interests through ‗some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.‖ Id. The Court in Lingle also 
essentially eliminated consideration of whether a regulation ―substantially advance[s] a legitimate 
state interest‖ under the Takings Clause. Id. at 540. It concluded that this test ―prescribes an inquiry 




 Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (―One who buys with 
knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss.  In such a case, the owner presumably 




 Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1083-84 (Wash. 1987).  Since tidelands are also 




 Archer & Stone, supra note 21, at 111. 
 
105
 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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beach behind his house as a permit condition for enlarging his home.
106
 
Although providing and protecting public access was a legitimate public 
purpose, the exaction was not sufficiently related to the project‘s stated 
impacts – blocking ocean views.
107
 The public access easement therefore 
lacked an ―essential nexus . . . between the condition and the original 
purpose of the building restriction.‖
108
 Under Nollan, public access to or 
along the Bay may be required as a permit condition to developing 
private property so long as it addresses the adverse effects caused by the 




E. ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,
110
 the Court added to the Nollan 
―essential nexus‖ test the requirement that an exaction must also be 
―rough[ly] proportional . . . both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development.‖
111
 In Dolan, the Court struck down the 
dedication of a bike path as a permit condition to authorize the 
construction of a hardware store.
112
  The Court found that although there 
was a nexus between the increased traffic caused by the store and the 
requirement for a bike path, the City did not establish the extent to which 
the bike path would mitigate the increased traffic or show that it was 
roughly proportional to the traffic impacts.
113
 
Dolan therefore requires ―some sort of individualized 
determination‖ that the dedication is ―roughly proportional‖ to the 
impacts of the development.
114
 The Court noted that ―government may 
not require a person to give up a constitutional right – here the right to 
receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use – in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where 






 Id. at 827. 
 
107
 Id. at 828. 
 
108






 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374 (1994). 
 
111
 Id. at 391. 
 
112
 Id. at 377-78. 
 
113
 Id. at 395-96. The Court held that ―[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but 
the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the 
pedestrian/bicycle pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic 
demand generated.‖ Id. 
 
114
 Id. at 391. 
 
115
 Id. at 385. 
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V. ―TAKINGS‖ AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
As noted above, the Takings Clause constrains government 
regulations and permit actions on private property. However, actions on 
public trust lands and waters are protected from takings claims in a 
number of ways. 
The state‘s public trust interest in tidelands and submerged lands is 
a dominant property interest, whether the state owns tidelands and 
submerged lands in fee, or has conveyed those lands to private parties 
and retains a public trust easement.
116
 The retained public trust easement 
protects government action from takings claims because the easement 
establishes allowable uses on trust property and therefore the state cannot 
take something it already owns. For example, the State of Washington‘s 
denial of a permit to build homes on platforms and pilings in tidal waters 
was held not a taking because the public trust doctrine precluded 
residential shoreline development.
117
 The denial of a fill permit was 
upheld in South Carolina because public trust tidelands ―effected a 
restriction on [the owner‘s] property rights inherent in the ownership of 
property bordering tidal water . . . [and] ownership rights do not include 
the right to backfill or place bulkheads on public trust land and the State 
need not compensate him for the denial of permits to do what he cannot 
otherwise do.‖
118
 In California, dredging privately owned tidelands to 
improve navigation was held not a taking because the city, as the state‘s 
trustee, retained a public trust easement over patented tidelands that 
enabled it ―to make improvements and changes in the administration of 
this easement without the exercise of eminent domain.‖
119
 California 
courts have also held that blocking access to private tidelands by 
constructing a bridge is not a taking.
120
 
Lucas also creates an exception to the takings doctrine where 
―background principles‖ of nuisance and property law prohibit the uses 
that the state regulates, even if the regulation leaves a property with no 
beneficial uses. This is because the regulation or restriction ―inheres in 
the title itself, [and] in the restrictions that background principles of the 




 See Newcomb v. City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 401-02 (Cal. 1936); People v. Cal. 
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596-99 (Cal. 1913); Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 183 




 Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 
118
 McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003). 
 
119
 City of Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d at 403. 
 
120
 See Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep‘t of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 416 (Cal. 1967). 
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ownership.‖
121
 As a background principle of state property law, the 
public trust doctrine may result in the application of the Lucas exception. 
This issue is being tested in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. 
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, argued before the 
United States Supreme Court in December, 2009.
122
 The case involves 
the application of the Florida Beach and Shoreline Preservation Act, 
enacted in 1965 to replenish sand on critically eroding beaches.
123
 The 
Act requires the state to establish a permanent mean high tide line prior 
to depositing new sand at public expense below the new line.
124
 
A group of private beachfront property owners claimed that fixing 
the mean high tide line took their common law property rights of 
accretion and contact with the water.
125
 The Florida Supreme Court 
upheld the state‘s action pursuant to the state‘s constitutional duty to 
protect state beaches held in trust for the public from future storm 
damage and erosion.
126
 It found that the Act did not substantially impair 
the littoral property right to contact with the water because it specifically 
preserved the right to access, views, boating, bathing and fishing.
127
 It 
also found that the right to accretion under Florida common law is a 
contingent right that appropriately balances public and private interests 
under the Shoreline Preservation and Protection Act.
128
 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine if 
the Florida Supreme Court decision constituted a ―judicial taking‖ of 
beachfront property rights. Aside from the novel issue of judicial takings 
and the effect of such claims on the federal judiciary, the Court‘s 
decision could profoundly affect a state‘s right to interpret its own 
common law and public trust doctrine, the circumstances under which 
the public trust doctrine can be utilized as a ―background principle‖ of 
property law under Lucas, and the viability of beach nourishment as a 
tool used by coastal communities to address coastal erosion exacerbated 




 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 
122
 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009).  
Oral argument was held on December 2, 2009. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. 
Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., No. 08-1151, 2009 WL 4323938 (Dec. 2, 2009). The U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
decision was rendered after this Article went to press. 
 
123
 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008). 
 
124
 Id. at 1106. 
 
125
 Id. at 1105. 
 
126
 Id. at 1120. 
 
127
 Id. at 1111 (citing Ferry Pass Inspectors‘ & Shippers‘ Ass‘n v. White‘s River Inspectors‘ 
& Shippers‘ Ass‘n, 48 So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909). 
 
128
 Id. at 1118-1119. 
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VI. SEA LEVEL RISE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
Under the Submerged Lands Act,
129
 states hold title to navigable 
waters, tidelands (to mean high tide), and submerged lands (generally to 
three miles offshore, except in the Gulf Coast of Florida and Texas).
130
 
The Act codified the general common law principle that ―[t]he state 
owns all tidelands below the ordinary high water mark, and holds such 
lands in trust for the public . . .‖
131
 As noted earlier, notwithstanding this 
grant under the Submerged Lands Act, five states allow private 
ownership to the mean low water mark: Maine, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware and Virginia.
132
 
California is not a ―low tide‖ state, so public ownership extends to 
the mean high tide line. In San Francisco Bay, the McAteer-Petris Act 
grants regulatory jurisdiction to BCDC over ―all areas that are subject to 
tidal action‖ to mean high tide,
133
 and areas within the ―shoreline band‖ 
(100 feet landward of the mean high tide line).
134
 Therefore, BCDC 
jurisdiction moves landward as sea level rises.
135
 California courts 
recognized that BCDC jurisdiction was ambulatory in 1994: ―If the sea 
level does rise [due to global warming], so will the level of mean high 




 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). 
 
130
 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(1)-(3), (b). The Submerged Lands Act resolved a dispute between 
California and the federal government over the right to lease offshore waters for oil and gas wells 
that resulted in a Supreme Court ruling that the federal government had paramount rights and power 
over the three-mile territorial sea. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1947). The Act 
relinquished title to the three-mile territorial sea to the states and allowed a state ownership rights 
beyond three miles if so provided by its constitution or laws prior to the time the state joined the 
Union (under the so-called ―equal-footing‖ doctrine). 43 U.S.C.A. § 1312. Only Texas and the West 
Coast of Florida have secured ownership rights beyond three miles under these provisions (to three 
marine leagues or approximately ten miles), although many other states have made claims. 
 
131
 See Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). The Submerged Lands Act resolved disputes over jurisdiction of the open ocean, not state 
ownership of tidelands. See, e.g., Oregon ex rel. State Land Board. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 
429 U.S. 363, 370, 372-74 (1977); People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584 (Cal. 1913); City of 
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (Cal. 1980); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 
n.5 (Cal. 1971). 
 
132
 Vestal, supra note 28, at 26 n.87. 
 
133
 Littoral Dev. Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm‘n, 24 Cal. App. 4th 
1050, 1057 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
 
134
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(a),(b) (Westlaw 2010). BCDC also has jurisdiction over 
certain specified waterways and marshlands lying up to five feet above mean sea level. CAL. GOV‘T 
CODE § 66610(a). 
 
135
 BCDC‘s jurisdiction is different from that of its sister coastal management agency, the 
California Coastal Commission, whose jurisdiction is geographically prescribed in different areas 
along the California coast. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30103(a) (California Coastal Act). 
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landward.‖
136
 It now appears that over the next century sea levels may 
rise far more than ―marginally.‖ Nevertheless, BCDC‘s jurisdiction will 
advance with the mean high tide line regardless of the ownership of 
tidelands and submerged lands.
137
 
Both the mean high tide line and the public trust doctrine are 
ambulatory.
138
 Therefore, rising sea levels advance not only agency 
jurisdiction but also public trust rights over newly submerged lands.
139
 
Thus, the inundation of private lands brings the public trust to bear on 






 Littoral Dev. Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th at 1066 n.5 (emphasis added).  The court held that 
BCDC‘s Bay jurisdiction extends to the mean high tide line, but not to the line of highest tidal 
action. Id. at 1066. 
 
137
 Id. at 1066. The issue of ownership of tidal and submerged lands is more complicated.  
Under common law, the gradual natural ―erosion‖ (or loss) of the shoreline or banks of navigable 
waters reduces riparian ownership rights, whereas gradual natural ―accretion‖ (or gain) of shoreline 
(called ―reliction‖ when the sea recedes) increases riparian ownership rights.  City of Los Angeles v. 
Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 666-68 (1929); see also City of Oakland v. Buteau, 180 Cal. 83, 87 (Cal. 
1919); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1014 (Westlaw 2010). However, artificial erosion in California, such as 
where a public works project interrupts the flow of sand transport along the coast, results in loss to 
the beachfront property owner. See Miramar Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 23 Cal. 2d 170, 176 (Cal. 
1943). Likewise, artificial or man-made accretion does not accrue to littoral or riparian property 
owners. See State ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 4th 50, 71-2 (Cal. 1995); 
see also California ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 277 (1982). On the 
other hand, under common law, violent or sudden changes in the shoreline from ―avulsion,‖ either 
loss or gain, generally do not affect property rights.  See Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 
748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951). 
 
138
 See Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
Under common law ―[t]he state owns all tidelands below the ordinary high water mark and holds 
such lands in trust for the public . . . [and] as the land along a body of water gradually builds up or 
erodes, the ordinary high water mark necessarily moves, and thus the mark or line of mean high tide, 
i.e., the legal boundary, also moves.‖ Id. at 411. 
 
139
 James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion and the Takings Clause:  How To Save 
Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279, 1368 (1998). (―As 
shorelines erode, the public trust doctrine follows the eroding shoreline.‖). 
 
140
 See Lechuza, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417 (―Such navigable waters are public ways for the 
purposes of navigation and transportation of products, and are held in trust by the state for the 
benefit of the public‘s recreational use as well, even when the underlying land is privately owned.‖). 
(emphasis added; citations omitted)). ―The Constitution and the decisions applying it make it 
abundantly clear that [a private party‘s] ownership interest in the land underlying [navigable waters] 
. . . could not encompass any interest in the waters themselves which would interfere with the public 
trust.‖ Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 3d 253, 257-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), 
overruled on other grounds, Hubbard v. Brown, 50 Cal. 3d 189, 197 (Cal. 1990).  ―Although, where 
the shore recedes as the result of avulsion, the boundary of the littoral proprietor may not change, the 
public has the same right of passage over the new foreshore as it had over the old—else an avulsion 
might cut off the public right of passage altogether.‖ People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 143 N.Y.S. 
503, 509 (1913), aff’d, 151 N.Y.S. 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), modified on other grounds, 218 N.Y. 
459 (1916). An exception may exist for temporarily flooded private lands under California Harbor 
and Navigation Code section 100 where public rights may be limited to a recreational and 
navigational easement over navigable waters above the mean high tide line. CAL. HARB. & NAV. 
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termination of public trust rights is not granted lightly and must be 
clearly expressed by the Legislature, courts or government agency with 
delegated authority over trust lands.
141
 Therefore, inundated private lands 
are likely to be subject to the public trust doctrine and the preservation of 
trust uses, and development that harms trust uses on such lands could be 
denied,
142




Another artifact of sea level rise undoubtedly will be an increase in 
the construction of sea walls and other shoreline protection devices. 
Since shoreline protection stops water levels and the mean high tide line 
from advancing landward, it could also prevent the landward movement 
of the public trust. However, a recent federal-court ruling in United 
States v. Milner held that the mean high tide line is measured in its 
unobstructed state as if shoreline protection did not exist.
144
 Milner cited 
as authority the seminal case of Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke,
145
 in which 
the Ninth Circuit held that navigable waters of the United States, as used 
in the River and Harbors Act, extend to all places covered by the ebb and 
flow of the tide to the mean high water mark in its unobstructed, natural 
state.
146
 Therefore, the mean high tide line under certain federal laws is 
measured in its natural and unobstructed state.
147
 
In Milner, littoral property owners erected shoreline protection on 
the dry sandy portion of their property that intersected the mean high tide 
line when the beach eroded.
148
 As trustees for the Lummi Nation, the 
federal government brought claims against the property owners for 
trespass and violations of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Clean Water 
Act.
149
 The court held that while littoral owners ―cannot be faulted for 
wanting to prevent their land from eroding away, we conclude that 
 
CODE § 100 (Westlaw 2010); see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044-51 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (public trust inheres in navigable waters over submerged lands owned in fee by 




 See People v. Cal. Fish Co., 166 Cal 576, 586, 591-92 (Cal. 1913). 
 
142
 See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 13, at 554. 
 
143
 Informal Advice from California Department of Justice, supra note 77, at 4, 15, 41, 48. 
 
144
 United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1197 (9th Cir. 2009).  A petition for a writ of 
certiorari for Milner was being reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court when this Article went to press. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sharp v. United States (No. 09-820). 
 
145
 Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 
146
 Id. at 753. 
 
147
 Milner, 583 F.3d at 1181 (―Under federal law, the upper boundary of any tidelands is the 
mean high water (MHW) line, which is determined by projecting onto the shore the average of all 
high tides over a period of 18.6 years.‖). 
 
148
 Id. at 1181. 
 
149
 Id. at 1180. 
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because both the upland and tideland owner have a vested right to gains 
from the ambulation of the boundary,‖ the littoral owners cannot 
permanently fix the property boundary.
150
 The court reasoned that, ―an 
owner of riparian or littoral property must accept that the property 
boundary is ambulatory, subject to gradual loss or gain depending on the 
whims of the sea.‖
151
 Consequently, the mean high tide line should be 
measured as if the shoreline protection did not exist for purposes of 
trespass and the Rivers and Harbors Act (but not the Clean Water Act).
152
 
Leslie Salt and Milner interpret federal law and therefore do not 
address the question of whether state jurisdiction and authority are 
subject to a similar rule. However, littoral and tideland owners in 
California may have statutory and common law rights to accretion and 
erosion.
153
 Since California courts have held that the mean high tide line 
is ambulatory,
154
 it could be argued under the rationale in Milner that 
shoreline protection that fixes the mean high tide line extinguishes the 
public‘s right to erosion and constitutes a trespass upon public trust 
lands. Moreover, it could also be argued that shoreline protection 
obstructs public trust rights to navigation, public access, and recreation, 
and that measuring the mean high tide line as if the shoreline protection 
did not exist would preserve those rights.
155




 Id. at 1187. 
 
151
 Id. at 1186; see also County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68-69 (1874). 
 
152
 Milner did not find that a violation of the Clean Water Act occurred, because the Act was 
intended to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation‘s waters by limiting the discharge of 
pollutants into the waters of the United States. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1194 (9th 
Cir. 2009); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2010). Since the defendant‘s bulkhead was 
constructed on dry land, there was never any discharge of materials into the waters of the United 




 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1014 (Westlaw 2010) (―Where, from natural causes, land forms by 
imperceptible degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, either by 
accumulation of material or by the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner of the 
bank, subject to any existing right of way over the bank.‖); Curtis v. Upton, 175 Cal. 322, 334 (Cal. 
1917); Strand Improvement Co. v. City of Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 772-73 (Cal. 1916); Carpenter 
v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). 
 
154
 See, e.g., Lechuza Villas W. v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 60 Cal. App.4th 218, 239 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997); see also City of Oakland v. Buteau, 180 Cal. 83, 87 (Cal. 1919). 
 
155
 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (―The public uses to which tidelands 
are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. . . . There is a growing 
public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands--a use encompassed 
within the tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may 
serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food 
and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. 
. . . ‗(T)he state in its proper administration of the trust may find it necessary or advisable to cut off 
certain tidelands from water access and render them useless for trust purposes.‖) (quoting City of 
Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 (Cal. 1970)). 
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artificial-accretion rule holds that an upland or littoral property owner 
does not gain alluvion from unnatural conditions,
156
 and California treats 
common law rights to erosion and accretion similarly.
157
 Therefore, a 
court could hold that artificial shoreline protection should not deprive the 
public of rights to land that would be tidelands in its natural state. 
As noted earlier, public trust uses in California and other states now 
extend beyond fishing, navigation and commerce, to the protection of 
recreation, wildlife, open space and the environment. Therefore, new 
actions and strategies supported by the public trust doctrine may be 
considered to address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise. 
These strategies are examined below. 
VII. USING THE PUBLIC TRUST TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
SEA LEVEL RISE 
A. ENHANCING PERMIT AUTHORITY 
Within San Francisco Bay and certain waterways,
158
 below mean 
high tide, BCDC has considerable discretion and authority to address the 
impacts of climate change and sea level rise. For example, projects 
within the Bay and certain waterways must demonstrate that ―public 
benefits . . . clearly exceed public detriment,‖ and no alternative upland 
locations are available; that any Bay fill is the ―minimum necessary;‖ 
that harmful effects are ―minimized‖ on water quality and circulation, the 
fertility of marshes, fish or wildlife resources, and ―other conditions 
impacting the environment;‖ and that ―sound safety standards . . . afford 
reasonable protection to persons and property against the hazards of 
unstable geologic or soil conditions or of flood or storm waters.‖
159
 
These provisions provide authority to mitigate a wide array of 
impacts from climate change and sea level rise for projects located in the 
Bay and below mean high tide. For example, BCDC could require 
projects built on tidelands and submerged lands to be designed so they 
are protected from rising sea levels; it could require dredging or Bay fill 
to minimize impacts on climate change and sea level rise; and it could 




 See State ex rel. State Lands Comm‘n v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.4th 50, 56 (Cal. 1995). 
 
157




 See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(e) (Westlaw 2010) (listing certain waterways, including 
areas subject to tidal action and marshlands up to five feet above mean sea level.). 
 
159
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a)-(e) (Westlaw 2010). 
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property from flooding.  Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides 
additional support to protect recreation, navigation, commerce, open 
space, and the environment from the impacts of climate change and sea 
level-rise within the Bay. 
However, projects within the 100-foot shoreline band pose 
significantly greater challenges for BCDC. The McAteer-Petris Act 
provides that a permit may be denied only if it ―fails to provide 
maximum feasible public access, consistent with the proposed project, to 
the bay and its shoreline.‖
160
 This limitation makes it difficult to require 
projects to address impacts of sea level rise and climate change on 
development within the shoreline band except to ensure that accessways 
are constructed to accommodate projected sea level rise, require 
alternative access if accessways are inundated, deny permits where 
projected sea level rise would destroy or harm public access, or require 
fees to mitigate impacts on public access.  Moreover, because projects 
located in the shoreline band are above mean high tide, they are 
generally not subject to the public trust doctrine and must meet the 
Lucas, Penn Central, Nollan, and Dolan takings tests if they are located 
on private property. 
To more effectively address the impacts of sea level rise and climate 
change, agencies like BCDC with limited shoreline authority may need 
to seek legislation either to expand their jurisdiction landward or increase 
their land-use authority, or both. However, in urban bays and estuaries 
with multiple local government jurisdictions, like San Francisco Bay, 
expanding regional land-use authority in this way is especially 
challenging politically. 
To address this dilemma, BCDC is currently considering new Bay 
Plan climate change policies to take sea level rise into account. The draft 
policies would require the preparation of risk assessments based on the 
100-year flood level, including future sea level rise.
161
 The draft policies 
also direct BCDC to formulate a regional climate change adaptation 
strategy with other regional, state and federal agencies, local 
governments, and the general public to identify the areas around the Bay 
that should be protected, areas where development should be removed, 






 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66632.4.  The Commission can also deny a project that is inconsistent 
with a priority use designation.  CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66611. 
 
161
 WILL TRAVIS & JOSEPH LACLAIR, SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. 
COMM‘N, DRAFT STAFF REPORT AND REVISED PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATION FOR PROPOSED 




 Id. at 9. 
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the time it will take to develop such a regional strategy, the draft policies 
propose that BCDC take a precautionary approach to planning and 
regulating any new development in areas vulnerable to flooding.
163
 
B. MITIGATION FEES 
When on-site mitigation is infeasible, and project denial is 
inappropriate, offsite fee-based mitigation may be an attractive 
alternative. As noted earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court‘s takings 
jurisprudence focuses heightened scrutiny on government actions that 
result in the ―physical occupation‖ of property (e.g., requiring the 
dedication of public access on private property).
164
 Although California 
courts recognize that the Takings Clause is especially protective against 
physical occupation or invasion of private property,
165
 they also note that 
government generally has greater leeway with respect to noninvasive 
forms of land-use regulation, where the courts have for the most part 
given greater deference to its power to impose broadly applicable fees, 




Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of 
the Takings Clause on mitigation fees directly, generally fees are viewed 
more favorably than land-use exactions because they do not result in a 
physical occupation or eliminate the value of property.
167
 California 
courts give agencies deference to impose fees, unless they are applied in 




 Id. at 11. 
 
164
 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 483 
U.S. 825 831, 831 (1987). 
 
165
 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 875-76 (Cal. 1996). 
 
166
 Id. at 876.  The court also stated that ―[f]ees of this nature may indeed be subject to a 
lesser standard of judicial scrutiny than that formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan because the 
heightened risk of the ‗extortionate‘ use of the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions is 
not present.‖ Id. 
 
167
 The Supreme Court has noted that ―we have not extended the rough-proportionality test of 
Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of 
development on the dedication of property to public use.‖ City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). In fact, the Nollan and Dolan heightened scrutiny does 
not apply at all to monetary exactions in most jurisdictions.  See Daniel J. Curtin & W. Andrew 
Gowder, Exactions Update: When and How Do the Dolan/Nollan Rules Apply?, 35 URB. LAW. 729, 
733-38 (2003); see, e.g., N. Ill. Home Builders Ass‘n v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-89 
(Ill. 1995); Home Builders Ass‘n v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000); Rogers 
Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 979-80 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Benchmark Land Co. 
v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
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abuse.‖
168





 fees on rents charged to 
daily users rather than long-term residents,
171
 and in-lieu fees imposed by 
the California Coastal Commission for the construction of sea walls.
172
 
Fees assessed by a set or general formula are viewed more 
favorably than fees that rely on government discretion or target a 
particular individual. The California Supreme Court has noted that 
―individualized fees warrant a type of review akin to the conditional 
conveyances at issue in Nollan and Dolan.‖ Therefore, a regulatory 
agency should ensure that an individual fee demonstrates ―a factually 
sustainable proportionality between the effects of a proposed land use 
and a given exaction.‖
 173
 
Generalized fees established by legislative mandate or formula 
typically are subject to the more favorable Penn Central balancing 
analysis
174
 and the reasonable relationship standard, because ministerial 
actions based on a legislatively imposed general mandate are less subject 
to abuse. In such a case, a government agency would need to show a 
―reasonable relationship between the monetary exaction and the public 
impact of the development,‖
175
 rather than satisfy the more rigorous and 
particularized Nollan/Dolan nexus and rough proportionality tests.  
Therefore, fee-based mitigation may be used to address impacts on 
public access to take into account how such access may be affected by 
climate change and sea level rise. Because set formula fees are viewed 
more favorably than discretionary fees by the courts, a formula to 




 San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 672 (Cal. 2002). 
The California Supreme Court articulated a very deferential standard, stating that only ―the arbitrary 
and extortionate use of purported mitigation fees, even where legislatively mandated, will not pass 
constitutional muster.‖ Id. at 671. 
 
169




 Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 952, 974 (Cal. 1999). 
 
171
 San Remo Hotel, 27 Cal. 4th at 670-72. 
 
172
 Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass‘n v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 163 Cal. App. 4th 215, 
245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 
173
 San Remo Hotel, 27 Cal. 4th at 666 (quoting Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 
854, 880 (Cal. 1996)). California courts are reluctant to categorize monetary fees as exactions under 
Nollan and Dolan. Therefore, fees applied generally on a ministerial basis, and not ad hoc, are likely 
to be subject to lower scrutiny and upheld. Fees must also bear a rational relationship to the 
damaging effects of sea level rise on the Bay or public access. As long as fees are used to study or 
address the effects of sea level rise on the Bay rather than to raise general revenue, these monetary 
exactions are unlikely to be considered a taking under these cases. 
 
174
 See McClung v. City of Summer, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
175
 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854 (Cal. 1996). 
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coastal armoring projects along the shoreline based upon its length, 
location or height to mitigate or study the effects of climate change and 
sea level rise (seawalls and coastal armoring are discussed in more detail 
below). Legislation could specifically authorize the use of fees to address 
sea level rise and climate change since legislatively imposed fees are 
generally more favorably viewed. 
C. COASTAL ARMORING 
Seawalls, revetments, and other shoreline protection devices along 
the coast are often constructed to protect existing development and 
public infrastructure.  In San Francisco Bay, 66% of the shoreline is 
already armored in some fashion.
176
 However, armoring in the wrong 
location can have significant adverse impacts. It can impede public 
access to and along the shore, destroy beaches and important habitat, 
reduce sediment inputs, reduce shoreline resiliency, prevent the inland 
migration of wetlands, increase erosion on adjacent properties, impede 
the flood-control functions of natural systems, increase flooding in 
unprotected areas, and visually impair coastal areas.
177
 For this reason, 
many states have banned or restricted the construction of seawalls and 







 Titus, supra note 139, at 1302. 
 
177
 See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 13, at 539-42 (―Californians have responded [to 
increased erosion] by armoring their coast with defense structures; at present, at least 10.2 percent of 
the state‘s Pacific coast is armored and a third of the Southern California coast sits behind some 
armoring structure. . . . A fortified coast comes with major financial, social, and ecological costs. 
These range from aesthetic losses to new barriers to public access to, critically, the physical losses of 
the beaches themselves--both to large erosion control structures and, most importantly, to the ocean 
as armoring leaves beaches unable to retreat before the rising sea. . . . [T]hese structures can also 
directly occupy the beach; a rock revetment may cover thirty to forty feet of beach width, as it must 
slope outward from the cliff top, typically at a 2:1 or 1.75:1 (horizontal to vertical) slope, replacing 
public beach with a boulder field. Seawalls, however, will normally occupy much less beach area. 
Armoring covers sandy beach that otherwise could be used for access and recreation. Armored walls 
also diminish, or destroy altogether, coastal access. Rather than being able to scramble down bluffs 
and dunes, beach-goers encounter vertical concrete walls or riprap fields, cutting them off from the 
sand below.‖); Todd T. Cardiff, Conflicts in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 255, 258-61 (2001) (shoreline armoring destroys the beach in three main ways: 
occupation loss, passive erosion, and active erosion). 
 
178
 The California Coastal Act prohibits shoreline protective devices for new development and 
requires new development to be designed so that it does not require the construction of armoring 
devices. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30253(b) (Westlaw 2010). But it also allows shoreline protective 
devices to protect existing development from erosion if designed to mitigate adverse impacts on 
shoreline sand supply.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30235. Maine and North and South Carolina prohibit 
seawalls and the construction of permanent erosion control devices on coastal dunes or areas 
seaward of a setback line based upon erosion rates and sea level rise projections. Maine Coastal 
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State laws banning or restricting seawalls and coastal armoring are 
not considered takings if they do not eliminate all beneficial uses of the 
property, or the seawalls are located on public trust lands.
179
 North 
Carolina courts have found there is no legal basis for the premise that 
―the protection of property from erosion is an essential right of property 
owners,‖
180
 because erosion and migration are natural acts that may 
divest owners of their property.
181
 Oregon has declared the dry sand areas 
of their beaches to be protected by the public trust under the doctrine of 
custom, precluding a riparian or littoral owner from asserting use of such 
areas as a recognized, exclusive property right.
182
 Government actions 




States may also require mitigation fees for the construction of 
seawalls, or require the creation of new wetland areas inland of levees 
and armoring projects. Where these strategies require property owners to 
dedicate portions of their property above mean high tide, they must meet 
the Nollan/Dolan tests. They should also identify areas that need 
protection, such as essential public and industrial infrastructure, high-
value commercial and residential development in flood-prone areas, and 
important wetland habitat or low-lying marshes and saltponds that could 
provide flood-control buffers. As noted earlier, strategies that involve 
 
Sand Dunes Rules 38 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-AA (Westlaw 2010); see Maine Bureau of Land 
& Water Quality, Sand Dune System rules, available at www.maine.gov/dep/blwq/docstand/ 
nrpapage.htm; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 (Westlaw 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-115.1 
(Westlaw 2010). Rhode Island bans erosion control devices along its entire oceanfront to protect 
public trust uses and allow wetlands and beaches to adapt to sea level rise. Rhode Island Coastal 
Resources Management Program § 300.7(D)(1)(2008), available at www.crmc.ri.gov/reg 
ulations.html. Oregon bans coastal armoring altogether. OR. ADMIN. R. 736-020-0010(6) (2005) 
(barring all permits for shoreline armoring for all development built after Jan. 1, 1977). 
 
179
 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 459-60 (Or. 1993). Oregon‘s law 
banning armoring for shoreline development built after 1977 was upheld on the grounds that it did 
not deny all economic use of the property. Id. at 460. See also Shell Island Homeowners Ass‘n, Inc., 
v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 417-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding North Carolina‘s ban on 
hardened structures constitutional). 
 
180
 Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n, 517 S.E.2d at 414. 
 
181




 City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 456-57. 
 
183
 Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (armoring 
that encroached on public lands was a nuisance); Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 196 Cal. App. 3d 
8, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (no vested right to construct sea wall under an emergency permit); 
Whaler‘s Vill. Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm‘n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) 
(Coastal Commission‘s conditions were reasonable); McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 
580 S.E.2d 116, 120 (S.C. 2003) (ownership rights do not include the right to construct bulkheads on 
public trust land, therefore no compensation due for the denial of permits). 
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general or legislatively imposed fees are not subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny. 
Shoreline protection policies in San Francisco Bay are more 
permissive than in many other coastal states, some of which ban the 
construction of seawalls altogether.
184
 BCDC policies allow the 
construction of seawalls and coastal armoring if ―necessary to protect the 
shoreline from erosion,‖ and if ―properly designed and constructed.‖
185
 
Nonstructural methods are required where feasible. The Bay Plan 
provides that ―[a]long shorelines that support marsh vegetation or where 
marsh establishment has a reasonable chance of success, the Commission 
should require that the design of authorized protective projects include 
provisions for establishing marsh and transitional upland vegetation as 
part of the protective structure, wherever practicable.‖
186
 
These policies were adopted twenty years ago, before the imminent 
threat of sea level rise from global climate change became apparent. 
Currently, shoreline protection devices constructed within the Bay 
(below mean high tide, or below five feet above mean sea level in 
marshlands) must be designed with sound safety standards able to 
―afford reasonable protection . . . against . . . flood or storm waters.‖
187
 
The Bay Plan also provides that ―structures on fill or near the shoreline 
should have adequate flood protection including consideration of future 
relative sea level rise as determined by competent engineers.‖
188
 These 
provisions allow BCDC some discretion to require shoreline protective 
devices constructed in the Bay to take into account projected sea level 
rise.  However, within the 100-foot shoreline band, BCDC‘s authority is 
limited to deny a project only if it ―fails to provide maximum feasible 
public access . . . to the bay and its shoreline.‖
189
 
These policies make it difficult to prevent coastal armoring from 
harming Bay resources or addressing impacts from climate change and 
sea-level rise. Consequently, BCDC is currently considering new Bay 
Plan policies that would limit new development that would require 
structural shoreline protection for the life of the project, or that would not 
be set back from the edge of the shore above the 100-year flood level, 




 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 
185
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 34. 
 
186
 Id. at 34-35. 
 
187
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(e) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
188
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 33. 
 
189
 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66632.4 (Westlaw 2010). 
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project.
190
 The draft policies would also require adverse impacts to 
natural resources and public access from shoreline protection to be 
avoided and mitigated or alternative access provided,
191
 that shoreline 
protection prevent significant impediments to physical and visual public 
access, and that shoreline protection be integrated with adjacent shoreline 
protection measures.
192
 BCDC is likely to vote on these new policies 
during the summer of 2010. 
To further address adverse impacts to Bay resources from shoreline 
protection, amendments to the McAteer-Petris Act could also be sought 
to authorize the approval the shoreline protection only if necessary to 
protect physical improvements, not to protect undeveloped or vacant 
land.  Similar provisions are currently provided in the California Coastal 
Act.
193
 This would help preserve undeveloped properties that absorb 
flood waters caused by sea level rise and reduce the need to protect 
developed areas elsewhere. In-lieu fees could also be considered to 
mitigate impacts of shoreline protection devices on public access or to 
purchase comparable beach access or tidelands.
194
 
D. ROLLING EASEMENTS 
The Texas Open Beaches Act authorizes the State of Texas to 
enforce a pre-existing public easement over the dry sandy beach from the 
mean high tide line to the first line of natural vegetation.
195
 This 
easement expands and contracts – or ―rolls‖ – with the natural migration 
of the beach vegetation line and therefore is called a ―rolling 
easement.‖
196




 TRAVIS & LACLAIR, supra note 161, at 11. 
 
191
 Id. at 15. 
 
192
 Id. at 14. 
 
193
 The California Coastal Act prohibits shoreline protective devices for new development and 
requires new development to be designed so that it does not require the construction of armoring 
devices. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30253(b) (Westlaw 2010). But it also allows shoreline protective 
devices to protect existing development from erosion if designed to mitigate adverse impacts on 
shoreline sand supply.  CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30235. 
 
194
 Such fees were upheld in Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass‘n v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm‘n, 163 Cal. App.4th 215, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 
195
 TEX.  ANN. § 61.018(a-1),(a-2) (Westlaw 2010). The Act declares that it is public policy of 
the State to secure ―the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned 
beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico,‖ and to protect other beach areas in 
which the public had independently acquired property rights under common law by prescription, 
dedication, or continuous use by the public.  Id. § 61.011(a). 
 
196
 See Titus, supra note 139, at 1313. The term ―rolling easement‖ refers to a ―broad 
collection of arrangements under which human activities are required to yield the right of way to 
naturally migrating shores.‖ Id. 
32
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/2
T. EICHENBERG PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:24 AM 
2010] CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 275 
structures that encroach on public beaches due to erosion or storms may 
be removed by petition.
197
 
A beachfront property owner brought an action challenging the 
constitutionality of the Open Beaches Act after being informed that her 
house was on public property and subject to removal after Hurricane Rita 
struck the Texas coast in 2005.
198
 The federal district court held that the 
Act did not effect a taking because the claim was not ripe and, under 
Texas common law, the public rolling easement over the dry sandy beach 
was a background principle of property law that pre-existed and was 
superior to the plaintiff‘s ownership rights.
199
 The Fifth Circuit 
unanimously affirmed the district court‘s ruling on ripeness and 
dismissed the takings claim, but split on the issue of ―unreasonable 
seizure‖ of the plaintiff‘s property and certified a series of questions to 
the Texas Supreme Court.
200
 In November 2009, the Texas Supreme 
Court heard oral arguments to determine whether the state recognizes a 
rolling easement under the Open Beaches Act or common law, and if so 
whether a landowner is due compensation for a ―taking‖ of property by 
imposition of the easement.
201
 During the same month, voters passed an 
amendment to the Texas Constitution essentially incorporating the 
Act.
202
 The Texas Supreme Court‘s ruling will impact the state‘s ability 
to apply its public trust doctrine, and will determine the efficacy of 
rolling easements to preserve common law public access rights and 
protect beaches from storms and sea level rise induced by climate 
change. 
A rolling easement is possible in states like Texas with a common 
law public easement above mean high tide.
203
 However, California and 
many other states have no public easement over the dry sandy beach 
above mean high tide, and such states will therefore need to seek other 
strategies. These strategies could include requiring deed restrictions as 




 See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex. App. 1986); Severance v. Patterson, 485 
F. Supp. 2d 793, 796-97 (S. D. Tex. 2007). 
 
198
 Id. at 797. 
 
199
 Id. at 803-04. The court also held that the takings claim was not ripe because the state had 
not taken any enforcement action against the property owner.  Id. at 801. 
 
200
 Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 504 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
201
 Joint Answering Brief for Defendant-Appellees at xiii, Severance v. Patterson, No. 09-
0387 (Tex. Sept. 4, 2009), available at www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs//09/09038702.pdf. 
 
202
 See TEXAS. CONST. art. I, § 33(b) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
203
 New Jersey and Oregon common law also provide for public access to the dry sandy beach 
above mean high tide. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass‘n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 
1984); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51-54 (N.J. 1972); 
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969). 
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on state property because of sea level rise, or to prevent activities that 
interfere with public trust uses, such as blocking public access, 




E. PRESERVING WETLANDS, MARSHES AND SALTPONDS 
Wetlands, marshes, and saltponds will likely to play a critical role in 
how bays and estuaries like San Francisco Bay respond to sea level rise 
and climate change.  Bay wetlands, including natural subtidal areas and 
tidal marshes, as well as managed wetlands such as diked marshes, 
saltponds, and agricultural baylands, absorb floodwaters, sequester 
greenhouse gases, and trap sediments and pollutants.
205
 Wetlands also 
can adapt to rising sea levels by migrating inland and continuing to 
provide flood protection, and key habitat and feeding grounds for a wide 
variety of aquatic and terrestrial species.
206
 
Most of San Francisco Bay‘s wetlands vanished long ago, making 
the conservation of remaining wetland areas even more critical.
207
 
BCDC‘s jurisdiction over areas below mean high tide, certain 
waterways, marshlands to five feet above mean sea level, and diked 
saltponds and managed wetlands
208
 allows use of the public trust doctrine 
to support its permit and regulatory actions within tidal wetlands below 
mean high tide. However, in marshlands, salt ponds and managed 
wetlands above mean high tide, the public trust doctrine can be used only 
where necessary to protect trust resources. 
As noted earlier, the public trust doctrine in California supports the 
preservation of trust lands ―in their natural state, so that they may serve 
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as 




 Titus, supra note 139, at 1313-14. 
 
205






 The 200,000 original acres of tidal marsh in the Bay have been reduced to 40,000 acres, 
and 6,000 miles of tidal channels have been reduced to 1,000. MICHAEL MONROE & PEGGY R. 
OLOFSON, SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA WETLANDS ECOSYSTEM GOALS PROJECT, BAYLANDS 




 CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66610(a)-(g) (Westlaw 2010). BCDC‘s authority over saltponds and 
managed wetlands, diked off and used three years immediately preceding 1969, is prescribed by 
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 66605(c)-(g); BCDC‘s authority over tidelands and submerged lands below 
mean high tide, marshlands below mean sea level, and certain waterways is prescribed by CAL. 
GOV‘T CODE § 66605(a)-(g). 
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and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.‖
209
 The 
trust can also be enforced by the public to protect wildlife not located on 
trust lands,
210
 and can prevent uses on non-trust lands and non-navigable 
waters if they harm navigable waters.
211
 However, BCDC and other state 
agencies may not enforce the trust outside its statutory and regulatory 
authority. Thus, for example, because BCDC lacks permit authority 
landward of the 100-foot shoreline band, it cannot rely upon the public 
trust doctrine to protect low-lying shoreline areas affected by sea level 
rise outside its jurisdiction. 
The Coastal Barrier Resources System (System) is another approach 
that could be utilized to protect wetlands and marshes. The System was 
created in 1982 to discourage development in hazardous coastal areas by 
prohibiting federal flood insurance and other federal subsidies for new 
development on coastal barrier islands vulnerable to flooding and 
storms.
212
 The System was expanded to barrier islands and coastal 
wetlands in the Florida Keys, Puerto Rico and the Great Lakes in 
1990,
213
 and the Department of the Interior was directed to map and 
recommend areas along the Pacific Coast for inclusion into the 
System.
214
 However, this effort was never undertaken.
215
 Although the 
System does not foreclose development, it removes federal incentives for 
new development in vulnerable coastal areas. Expansion of the System to 
the West Coast to include coastal wetlands and low-lying areas 
vulnerable to sea level rise, and the adoption of a similar system under 
state law, would help remove perverse market incentives for developing 
flood-prone areas vulnerable to sea level rise and reduce the need for 
regulatory measures that risk takings claims. 
F. IMPLEMENTING THE CZMA AND CEQA  
BCDC and other state coastal management agencies may also use 
the public trust doctrine to address sea level rise and climate change 




 Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (emphasis added). 
 
210




 Nat‘l Audubon Soc‘ty v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) 
(―We conclude that the public trust doctrine, as recognized and developed in California decisions, 
protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries.‖). 
 
212
 See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
213
 Elise Jones, The Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Common Cents Approach to Coastal 
Protection, 21 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1020-21 (1991). 
 
214
 See id. at 1039. 
 
215
 Id. at 1039-40 (1991). 
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implements the San Francisco Bay Segment of the California Coastal 
Management Program (CCMP) under the CZMA. This gives BCDC the 
authority to determine if federal agency activities and federally-permitted 
activities that affect the land and water uses or natural resources of the 
Bay are conducted in a manner ―consistent‖ with the enforceable policies 
of the CCMP.
216
 The enforceable policies of the CCMP include the 
McAteer-Petris Act, Suisun Marsh Preservation Act, the Bay Plan, and 
BCDC‘s other laws, regulations and policies.
217
 The Bay Plan requires 
BCDC to assure that actions affecting trust lands are ―consistent with the 
public trust needs for the area.‖
218
 Therefore, under the CZMA, BCDC 
may require federal and federally-permitted activities that affect the Bay, 
such as federal highways, airports, dredging, and levees, as well as EPA 
discharge permits and Corps wetland permits, to be consistent with the 
public trust doctrine. Similar authority applies to other state coastal 
management programs. 
BCDC also reviews projects under the California Environmental 
Quality Act (CEQA).
219
 Like many other state environmental impact 
assessment laws, CEQA requires the identification and prevention of 
significant environmental effects.
220
 A ―significant effect on the 
environment‖ is defined as a ―substantial adverse change in the physical 
conditions which exist in the area affected by the proposed project.‖
221
 
Under CEQA, a lead agency prepares an Initial Study to determine 
whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment.
222
 A 
Negative Declaration is prepared if the lead agency determines a project 
has no significant effects,
223
 and an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) 




Once an EIR has been prepared and certified as complete, public 
agencies must make certain findings pertaining to each significant 
environmental effect identified in the EIR.
225
 An agency may require 




 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c). 
 
217
 SAN FRANCISCO BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM‘N, supra note 25, at 9. 
 
218
 Id. at 79. 
 
219
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 11500 et seq. (Westlaw 2010) (CEQA Guidelines). 
 
220
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a)(1)-(3). 
 
221
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(g). 
 
222
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(k)(2). 
 
223
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15070(a). 
 
224
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(k)(3). 
 
225
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a). 
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significant environmental impacts;
226
 it may find that the responsibility to 
lessen a significant environmental impact lies with another public 
agency;
227
 or it may find that specific economic, legal, social, 
technological, or other considerations make it infeasible to mitigate the 
significant effects of the project.
228
 If mitigation is deemed infeasible, the 
lead agency writes a statement of overriding considerations explaining 
why the economic, legal, social, technological, or other benefits 
outweigh the unavoidable environmental risks.
229
 Once a finding is made 
for each significant effect, an agency may approve the project. 
The California Office of Planning and Research (OPR) recently 
developed guidelines to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under 
CEQA.
230
 The new guidelines, among other things, require lead agencies 
to quantify GHG emissions when determining significant impacts
231
 and 
allow lead agencies to use thresholds of significance, developed by other 




The guidelines also require cumulative impact analyses for GHG 
emissions, allow general plans containing summaries of GHG projects to 
be used for the analysis, and clarify what types of land-use plans may be 
used when analyzing GHG emissions.
233
 These amendments to the 
CEQA guidelines will play a critical role in a lead agency‘s review, and 
also will help shape the policies of responsible agencies. 
An agency like BCDC may prepare an environmental assessment or 
EIR when it acts as the lead agency,
234
 or comment on an EIR when it is 
a responsible agency.
235




 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(1). 
 
227
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(2). 
 
228
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15091(a)(3). 
 
229
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15093(a)-(c). 
 
230
 See CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, ADOPTED TEXT OF THE CEQA GUIDELINE 
AMENDMENTS (2009), available at http://ceres.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/Adopted_and_Transmitted_ 
Text_of_SB97_CEQA_Guidelines_Amendments.pdf. These amendments became effective on 
March 18, 2010.  Id. 
 
231
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
232
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.7(a), (c). 
 
233
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15130(a), (d). 
 
234
 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 11520. BCDC is not required to prepare an EIR under CEQA 
because it has a Certified Equivalent Program that considers comparable environmental 
considerations as an EIR. To reduce delay and paperwork, BCDC is authorized to perform its 
certified equivalent program in lieu of an EIR when it acts as a lead agency. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 
21080.5(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
235
 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(d) (Westlaw 2010). The California Department of Justice 
has prepared a fact sheet listing various mitigation measures that can be implemented by local 
agencies under CEQA. Cal. Attorney Gen.‘s Office, Addressing Climate Change at the Project Level 
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federal actions on the Bay under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).
236
 Thus, CEQA and NEPA provide an opportunity to 
recommend measures to mitigate impacts of state and federal actions on 
public trust uses, including public access and the preservation of open 
space and natural areas needed to protect the Bay against the impacts of 
climate change and sea level rise. 
G. PURSUING COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
Common law doctrines provide a number of affirmative remedies to 
protect public trust uses in ways that can address the impacts of sea level 
rise and climate change. Doctrines like dedication, custom and 
prescription provide a legal mechanism to preserve public rights to 
beaches or other areas traditionally used by the public. Privately owned 
beaches and adjacent uplands that offer access to beaches may be 
impliedly ―dedicated‖ for public use if members of the public use the 
beaches or adjacent uplands for five years, as if they were public 
recreation areas, without objection by the private owner.
237
 The common 
law in some states also recognizes that the long and uninterrupted past 
use of a beach above mean high tide can create a legally protected right 
by ―custom‖ to continue to such use.
238
 Public rights may also be gained 
by ―prescription,‖ if public use is open, notorious and continuous for a 
statutory period of time. 
Activities that endanger public life or health, obstruct the free use of 
property, interfere with the enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully 
obstruct the free passage or use of navigable waters also may constitute 
public nuisances.
239
 For example, coastal armoring that encroaches on 
public land has been held a public nuisance in California, justifying 
removal without the payment of compensation.
240
 In Florida, 
 
(2010), http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/GW_mitigation_measures.pdf. However some of these 
measures are not within BCDC‘s statutory and regulatory authority. 
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 43 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). 
 
237
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597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
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 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (Westlaw 2010); see also People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 
Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
 
240
 Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The court 
held that the city‘s removal of the seawall did not constitute inverse condemnation because the 
―Legislature has the power to declare certain uses of property a nuisance and such use thereupon 
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construction seaward of an established control line fifty feet from mean 
high tide is prohibited as a public nuisance under the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act.
241
 Bulkheads or sea walls that flood adjacent properties 




As sea levels rise, development may encroach on public lands, harm 
other properties, or impede the protection of bays and estuaries from the 
effects of climate change. In proper cases, public agencies may be able 
use their police powers to remove structures that constitute public 
nuisances, or pursue other common law remedies to preserve open space, 
protect habitat, and provide buffers to accommodate rising sea levels or 
storm surge. In such cases, agencies may need to seek additional 
legislative authority, or work with state attorneys general, state lands 
commissions and other government agencies. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Government agencies like BCDC face a tremendous challenge to 
address the impacts of climate change and sea level rise. The public 
easement created by the public trust doctrine is not a panacea and does 
not provide additional authority not already provided under existing 
agency laws and policies.
243
 However, the trust can be used to support 
decisions promoting public uses and preserving lands in their natural 
state that might otherwise be held takings under the U. S. and state 
Constitutions. The public trust doctrine can also support the 
implementation of common law remedies to protect areas vulnerable to 
sea level rise and to prevent activities that impede efforts to address the 
impacts of climate change. Some of these actions can be implemented 
under existing authority, but other actions may require new legislation, 
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